Turkey demands a Strategy

Kobane symbolises the struggle between the forces of the Islamic State (IS) and the West. The Kurds hold the ground in this conflict but it is the city, the buildings, the very streets they fight on that have taken on a new symbolic meaning. If Kobane falls the West will appear weak in its fight against IS; if it stands it alleviates the pressure for Western ground troops and represent a prolific victory in this protracted conflict.

According to the Western news channels the Kurds and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are winning the battle for Kobane as 150 Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga bring heavy weapons and 200 FSA join the weary fighters on the front.

Whereas, a report by John Cantlie for IS declares that the city has almost been taken.

Are these fighters simply buying the West time?

Maybe the West is missing something. The media wants to focus on Kobane because of its heroic nature which almost seems like Britain during the Second World War. An island of freedom fighting desperately against a successful adversary where the major power player stands by watching. Turkey sounds comparable to the US in that degree.

However, what is the difference between Kobane and Homs? Why are we so engaged in protecting Kobane but against Assad we were unwilling to be involved?

What we are missing is a strategy.

What we ironically think we have, in the words of Phillip Hammond speaking to the House of Commons on the 16th October, is a 'clear strategy to take the fight to ISIL. A strategy with military, political and wider counter-terrorism components. A strategy that we recognise, at least in parts, will need to be sustained over the long-term. We are under no illusion as to the severity of this challenge to regional stability and to our homeland security.' I have learnt recently that when a politician uses the word clear you may as well discount the sentence that follows.

Obama stated 'we don’t have a strategy yet'. So do we or do we not?

The contention is the end-state.

Phillip Hammond argues that 'at the heart of our strategy is the political strand. IS will not be overcome until Iraq and Syria have inclusive governments capable of marginalising its appeal and of mounting a sustained and effective response on the ground to the military and ideological threat it poses.'

I agree but that end-state is exactly what Turkey desires. So why was the Turkish Prime Minster Ahmet Davutoglu still questioning what the future after IS will look like?

He is pondering the question we are all thinking but unwilling to tackle. Who will come after IS? If we neutralise them in a ground offensive will the Syrian and Iraqi governments be robust enough to stop another insurgency on a similar scale?

How do we tackle IS?

We need to signal to Turkey how the West intends to tackle IS and maintain peace afterwards. We do have ground forces in the vicinity training the Iraqi army but we need more. I find it hard to believe that sending weapons and technology to the Iraqi army helps, it is the training to work as a combined force that is vital. Perhaps from this they can regain some willpower that is key to stemming the growth of IS.

I understand Turkey's position. They share a long border with Syria and Iraq and therefore to strike against IS would bring repercussions. Furthermore, as a member of NATO it would necessitate a military response from the West. What they desire is a strategy from the West that has been thought through and tackles how to remove the Assad regime. Their behavior is showing hindsight before rushing into an ill-defined war.

For as Sun Tzu stated, 'strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory: tactics without strategy is just the noise before defeat.'

The question is, how long can we leave it?